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Governments play a central role in the organization and
financing of health services, and their actions in promoting
equitable health care contribute to their legitimacy. Chile’s
system of health insurance and health care has raised
concerns about equity in the financing of this care. This
research extends the analysis of equity to the question of
access to care, with special emphasis on the heaviest users
of medical care: i.e., those aged 65 and over. Data from the
1998 Chilean national CASEN survey show that there were
substantial inequities both between and within public and
private insurance in this respect. The persistence of inequities
within public health insurance indicates that even when
financial equity and efficiency are improved, additional
attention must be given to barriers to obtaining medical care
if inequities in access are to be reduced.
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I
Introduction
State involvement in health care plays important
material as well as symbolic roles in a society (Esping-
Andersen, 1994). Governments promote and regulate
medical services to keep people well and treat the sick
–an activity that absorbs a significant portion of GDP in
most nations and also carries out an important symbolic
function in offering a visible benefit to the population
in general. In this sense, government involvement in
the medical care system plays a legitimation function
in the society. To achieve this legitimation function, the
State must provide a system that is not only effective
but that also appears equitable. Since the elderly are
the highest users of health services, and are also often
one of the most “legitimate” groups in a society for the
receipt of public benefits, the equity of public policy in
health care for the aged provides a valuable insight into
the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Health care
for the elderly is gaining increased governmental
attention in Latin America, since a number of countries
(Cuba, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile) are in an
advanced stage of the demographic transition in which
over 10% of the population is aged 60 and over, and
both birth and death rates are low (Villa and
Rivadeneira, 2000). This situation is accompanied by
an epidemiological transition where the primary burden
of illness has shifted from acute to chronic diseases
that are concentrated among the older population (PAHO,
1998). With 29% of urban households and 37% of rural
households in Chile containing older persons (ECLAC,
2001), a substantial portion of the population is directly
affected by the health care received by older persons.
Chile was one of the first countries in Latin
America to undertake “structural adjustment policies”
in the 1970s and 1980s. Following neoliberal principles,
the then military government adopted new policies
designed to reduce the State’s role in the economy and
society. While the privatization and individual capitation
of both the public pension and health insurance systems
were adopted as solutions to fragmentation and
underfunding, the State continues to play a significant
role in subsidizing and regulating both systems (Morley,
Machado and Pettinato, 1999; Arenas de Mesa, 2000).
In the health arena, most middle-class (and hence
wealthier) formal sector workers moved from the State-
supported Sermena insurance scheme to private
insurance companies (Isapres - Instituciones de Salud
Previsional). Other wage workers remained with a new
State-supported and subsidized insurance system
(Fonasa - Fondo Nacional de Salud), and the military
retained its own insurance system. Organizationally,
medical care provision was separate from insurance in
both the public and private sectors, resulting in a
pluralistic system in these two respects (Borzutsky,
1999). The public sector has worked during the 1990s
to further separate its roles as a regulator, provider and
purchaser of medical care, with moderate but uneven
success (Sojo, 1999).
Health insurance in Chile is “purchased” with a
mandatory flat 7% assessment of each worker’s salary
(with no employer contribution). This “premium” can
be applied to insurance in the public system (Fonasa),
in one of the many companies in the private system
(Isapres), or in the military system1 in the case of armed
forces personnel. Both public and private insurance
focuses on acute care services (hospitals, doctors’ fees,
and lab and x-ray costs), with a variety of copayments
and fee schedules (effectively, payment caps and benefit
ceilings). Insurance companies (including the State)
have agreements with some private providers who
accept fixed fee schedules as full payment. The charges
of other private providers can exceed the maximum
payments of insurers, often substantially. State-owned
hospitals and clinics always accept public insurance
payment schedules, and also accept patients with private
insurance.
Public insurance in Chile is a four-tier system based
on the level of income of beneficiaries. Those with no
income (the indigent) are in Fonasa A, which requires
no copayments and is limited to the use of public clinics
and hospitals. Those with incomes near the minimum
wage can receive Fonasa B for their 7% contribution,
which also has no copayments for the use of public
sector health facilities, but along with FONASA C and D
has access to a “free choice” option that pays for care
1
 Military personnel contribute 6% of their salary while the State
pays the remaining 1%; until 1998 armed forces retirees were
limited to the military insurance system, but now they can opt to
contribute to Fonasa or an Isapre instead.
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from the private sector (with a 50% or higher copayment
using a pre-established fee schedule). Persons with
higher incomes are placed in Fonasa C or Fonasa D,
which require 10% and 20% copayments respectively
when using the public system, based on fee schedules
that are typically lower than those used by private
practitioners (World Bank, 1995). Fonasa A and B are
subsidized by the State, since they cost more than their
premiums bring in, while those enrolled in Fonasa C
and D redistribute some resources, since their aggregate
costs of care are less than their premiums (Bitrán and
others, 1996). The Armed Forces insurance system also
has a “free choice” option with limits similar to those
of the Fonasa free choice system.
In the private insurance market, individuals can pay
extra premiums, beyond the required 7%, to improve
the coverage (particularly in terms of payment caps per
service) and choices in their insurance. In the year 2000,
50% of all families with private coverage paid extra to
improve their coverage (Superintendencia de ISAPRES,
2001). Private insurance companies are allowed to
adjust their premiums and benefits for risk, on the basis
of sex, age, and number of dependents. For example, a
common plan costs a 65 year old single man six times
what it costs a 35 year old single man. Each private
insurance company may therefore have hundreds of
possible plans to accommodate different incomes, with
each plan varying widely with regard to copayments
and services covered (Larrañaga, 1997). Because
premiums rise substantially with age, in 1998 ISAPRES
covered about 24% of persons under age 65, but only
7% of persons aged 65 and over (Ministry of Planning
and Cooperation, 1999). While almost all ambulatory
care for the privately insured population is provided
by the private sector, privately insured persons also
make use of public sector hospitals at times. The use of
public sector hospitals has represented an indirect public
subsidy of the private sector, since the public sector
has not had adequate information systems for billing
the private insurance companies when appropriate.
II
The role of equity in medical care
The Chilean State made “equity”, along with “growth”,
a central pillar of its public policy when democracy
was restored in 1990 (Muñoz Porras, 1998). National
economic growth did continue for most of the 1990s,
and poverty rates declined, but economic inequality also
increased as measured by the percentage of total urban
income earned by the wealthiest 10% of urban
households and the rising Gini index of income
inequality (ECLAC, 2001). Equity in the publicly visible
sectors of social and health services was a goal of the
center-left government, as a way to maintain broad
popular support, even though it was obliged by the 1980
Constitution to act within the political and economic
structure developed by the military regime. The stated
goals of the Ministry of Health in the 1990s were equity,
decentralization and patient satisfaction/participation
(Ministry of Health, 1999).
Equity in medical care is also a priority issue in
other Latin American nations (Alleyne, 2002) and
throughout the world (WHO, 2000; Hurst and Jee-
Hughes, 2000), and it involves a number of different
dimensions, including the distribution of the outcomes,
the process, and financing. Unlike a focus on efficiency,
which tries to maximize the results obtained per unit
of financial input, equity examines the extent to which
each of those dimensions is distributed across the
population (Hurst, 2001). In Chile there is particular
concern about equity between different socioeconomic
groups and between different geographic regions of the
country (sometimes expressed as rural-urban
differences, but more often as differences between the
13 administrative regions into which the country is
divided from north to south).
Outcome indicators which are considered
important in Chile include mortality (especially infant
mortality) and life expectancy. Infant mortality in Chile
continues to vary by region and mother’s education
(Muñoz Porras, 1998; Hollstien and others, 1998), even
though it has fallen dramatically over the past 40 years
and Chile is tied for first place internationally in the
level of equity in child survival (WHO, 2000; Hurst and
Jee-Hughes, 2000). Total mortality rates, however,
continue to show inequalities, since they are associated
with the income levels of communities (Arteaga and
others, 2002). Life expectancy has risen during the past
40 years, even among those who are already aged 60,
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although the remaining life expectancy at that age varies
between 21.1 and 23.1 years across the administrative
regions (Morales and Villalón, 1999).
The process indicators describe the manner in
which the outcomes are being produced, including the
quality of care and access to services. Gender and
income inequalities are high as regards the use of
medical and dental care, suggesting that there are
gender and income barriers to access (PAHO, 2000;
Arteaga and others, 2002). The degree of satisfaction
with the health care system is also closely associated
with income (Rodríguez and Tokman, 2000). The World
Health Organization (WHO) terms this element of equity
“responsiveness”, and its survey of key informants
places Chile 45th in overall achievement but 103rd in
equity of responsiveness (WHO, 2000; Hurst and Jee-
Hughes, 2000). The structure of the dual public-private
health care and insurance systems is an important cause
of income-related inequality in the services received
(Sojo, 1996).
Financing is often measured by the contributions
by or spending on each beneficiary. Equitable
contributions are those which involve a non-regressive
proportion of a person’s discretionary income, while
equitable spending involves a correlation between
medical needs and the resources used. In Chile,
spending on medical care is inequitable because the
public sector spends about 93,000 pesos per capita per
year compared to the 143,000 pesos per capita spent
by the private sector although the population served by
the latter is healthier and younger (Titelman, 1999).
This is only a minimal estimate of the spending inequity,
since these data do not include the substantial
copayments in the private sector, meaning that the actual
spending gap is substantially higher. There is also
widespread concern over the risk selection of private
insurance, which forces older and higher-risk persons
to rely to a disproportionate extent on the publicly
subsidized FONASA system (Bitrán and Almarza, 2000;
Sojo, 1999; Sapelli and Torche, 1998). In contrast to
Chile’s world leadership in the equity of infant survival,
it comes 168th (out of 191) in the WHO’s measure of
fairness of financial contribution (WHO, 2000; Hurst
and Jee-Hughes, 2000).
The financing of medical care in Chile during the
1990s shows the lowest levels of equity among the three
key dimensions of health systems performance –
outcomes, process, and financing. Policy initiatives
(such as the Universal Explicitly Guaranteed Access
Plan (Plan AUGE) during the early 2000’s have focused
on improving access to expensive services for all and
on the reduction of long waiting lists in the public sector,
by using a more equitable financing system.
The following analysis seeks to improve our
understanding of the factors that influence the equity
of the health care system that the reforms build upon,
by examining the situation of those most dependent on
medical care: i.e., persons aged 65 and over. It goes
beyond the existing literature on equity in Chilean
health insurance, which usually makes a dichotomy
between the public and private sectors and provides
bivariate analyses (see for example Larrañaga, 1999;
Lenz and others (eds.), 1999; Muñoz Porras, 1998),
since it shows the variations within the health care sector




This study uses the 1998 CASEN (National
Socioeconomic Profile Survey) that was conducted by
the Chilean Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
(MIDEPLAN) during November and December of that
year. It is a nationally representative survey of 48,103
households and 188,348 individuals, including 14,910
persons aged 65 and over. The Economic Commission
for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), a United
Nations regional research centre, adjusted the reported
income to account for missing data and underreporting
of income (ECLAC, 1999). All analyses were conducted
using normalized weights to adjust for the
disproportionate sample sizes in rural regions.
Indicators of health care access in the survey
include whether the respondent was ill or injured in
the past three months, if so, whether they received
medical attention, and if they received attention, did
they experience any delay in obtaining care (a lot, a
little, none). A series of questions was asked on the
medical care received, including how many times
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respondents had a well-visit (“Control Preventivo de
Salud”), saw an ambulatory care doctor, and saw a
specialist in the past three months. All of these variables
were dichtomized into yes/no responses. Respondents
who used medical services and/or prescription
medications when ill were asked how they paid for
them. Responses were divided into two classes: those
who had no out of pocket costs, versus those who did.
Finally, women were asked if they had ever had a pap
smear. The question on health insurance coverage
included a category for those who knew they were in
the State-supported insurance system but were not sure
which sub-category they belonged to. To include these
persons in the regression analysis, we imputed them to
a specific insurance type, using a hot-deck imputation
procedure with stratified groups of rural vs. urban,
married vs. other, 70+ vs. 65-69, any high school
education vs. other, and per capita family income
quartiles. These cases accounted for 3% of those with
State-supported insurance. The other insurance types
included the armed forces insurance system, Isapres,
private arrangements (including non-members of
Isapres, members of workers’ mutual insurance
schemes, and uninsured), and “others”.
The demographic characteristics used to stratify
the user population included age, gender, income,
education, and rural location. With respect to age, a
distinction was made between those aged 65-74 and
those aged 75 and over. Income was adjusted by ECLAC
for missing values and underreporting (ECLAC, 1999)
and was presented as household income per capita. In
the regressions, household income per capita was
dichotomized between the lowest quintile of those in
the insurance plans analysed and the remaining four
quintiles (the per capita household income of the bottom
quintile was 45,000 pesos per month; in comparison,
the minimum State old age pension was 23,000 pesos
per month in 1998). Education was reported in years of
schooling, and in the regressions it was dichotomized
between less than high school (0-8 years) and any level of
high school education (compulsory education does not
extend to the high school level in Chile). Rural areas were
considered to be those outside of formal communities.
After assessing the frequency distributions of the
socioeconomic variables and access to health care,
logistic regression equations were estimated for each
of the access variables, using the socioeconomic
variables (education, income, gender, age and residence
in urban or rural areas) as controls. The analysis was
limited to those covered by the general State-supported
insurance system (FONASA), the armed forces insurance
scheme, and private insurance (Isapres). These
insurance types were entered as categorical variables,
taking private insurance as the reference group. Since
a single logistic regression equation only documents
the statistical significance of differences between the
various insurance types and the reference group,
multiple equations were estimated in which the
reference group was changed so that each insurance
type could be evaluated against all of the others.
IV
Findings
Among persons aged 65 and over, the State-supported
insurance scheme (Fonasa) is by far the most common
(table 1). A quarter of the elderly population receive
insurance through Fonasa A (the system for indigents),
meaning that they do not receive even a minimum
pension or earnings. This insurance is also the most
restricted in its coverage. Over one-third are in Fonasa
B, indicating that their pensions or earnings are at or
near the minimum. Fonasa A and B together cover 62%
of all persons aged 65 and over in Chile. The two State-
supported plans that enroll elders with more resources,
Fonasa C and Fonasa D, together cover 15% of the
elderly. Another 3% knew they had public health
insurance coverage but were not sure at which level.
Altogether, in 1998, the general State-supported
insurance covered 80.4% of the elderly population. The
Armed Forces scheme covered less than 6% and private
insurance (Isapres) less than 7%. About 6% were
covered by a variety of other “private” arrangements,
including special programmes that cover work-related
disability and those not currently enrolled in any plan.
Both the mean and median family incomes per
person vary by type of plan (table 1). The different levels
of Fonasa, which are linked to income, reflect these
differences. The median per capita household income
of those in the highest income plan (Fonasa D) is double
that of the persons enrolled in the lowest income plan
that requires the payment of contributions (Fonasa B).
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The income of those covered by the Armed Forces plan
is similar to that of the members of Fonasa D, while
those enrolled in Isapres have a median income about
1.75 times that of those in Fonasa D. The median per
capita household income of persons with private
insurance is just above the 90th percentile for all the
elderly in Chile. Those with private insurance are also
the youngest, are least likely to be female, and have
the highest education. In other words, private insurance
is most commonly held by older persons whose
demographic characteristics are associated with the
lowest medical needs and highest resources. Those with
private insurance or Armed Forces coverage are the least
likely to live in rural areas. This is consistent with the
findings of other research involving all ages, which
report that the public system as a whole has a population
with higher needs than the private system (Ministry of
Planning and Coordination, 2001).
There were likewise large differences in the
indicators on access to care by older persons according
to their insurance status (table 2). Persons with private
insurance were among the least likely to report being
sick or having an accident in the previous three months,
while Fonasa A and B (which are the lowest income
groups) were the most likely to report illnesses. Among
those reporting an illness, those with private insurance
were the most likely to report obtaining medical
attention, while those with Fonasa A and private
arrangements were the least likely, with about one-
quarter of those reporting illnesses or accidents not
having received medical attention. Among those
receiving medical attention, those with insurance
through Isapres and those with Armed Forces coverage
were the most likely to report that they received care
promptly and without delay, while Fonasa A registered
the fewest persons reporting prompt care. Almost all
the privately insured obtained ambulatory physician
care from private practitioners, along with almost half
of those in Fonasa D. The least likely to see a private
practitioner were those in Fonasa A, who almost
exclusively used public providers, and those with
military coverage, most of whom used military health
care providers. Only 5% of the elderly population
reported using emergency care services, but the pattern
TABLE 1
Chile: Characteristics of persons aged 65 and over,
according to insurance type, 1998 a
Entire Fonasa A Fonasa B Fonasa C Fonasa D Fonasac Armed Isapres Private
countryb (indigents) (exact plan Forces (private) arrange-
not known) ments
sample n = 14 910d 4817 5787 738 935 414 520 562 927
Plan penetration (%) 100 25.0 37.2 6.0 9.1 3.1 5.7 6.7 5.9
Mean incomee 160,223 68,368 107,886 155,048 246,436 213,157 252,555 520,149 222,459
Median incomeef 74,784 51,844 74,916 96,185 142,118 104,612 154,155 252,340 98,194
Mean age 73.2∀.1 73.7∀.1 73.5∀.1 72.8∀.3 71.8∀.2 74.5∀.4 73.6∀.3 71.0∀.3 72.4∀.2
Persons aged 75
and over (%) 35.5 39 37.2 35.4 27.7 45.9 39.9 21.8 30.3
Females (%) 57.3 57.4 59.9 53.4 51.1 56.9 62.2 48 57.2
Less than full primary
schooling (%) 47.8 74.3 55.1 33.8 18.6 35.2 14.4 8.5 32.9
Some high school
education (%) 29.2 9.0 19.7 37.2 56.6 38.8 51.9 74.5 43.9
Mean years
of education 7.1∀.01 3.4∀.04 5.0∀.05 7.1∀.15 9.3∀.1 7.0∀.22 8.5∀.16 11.6∀.20 7.5∀.15
Rural residents (%) 17.7% 36 17 5.4 4.8 5.9 1.8 2.7 17.1
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of research results.
a FONASA: National Health Fund. Isapres: Private health insurance companies. Armed Forces: Health system of the Chilean Armed Forces.
b Includes “other” and “don’t know” insurance types, which are not shown separately and constitute 1.3% of respondents.
c Corresponds to persons who are FONASA members but do not know at which level.
d Represents 1,085,000 residents of Chile aged 65 and over.
e Mean income is total family income per person per month in Chilean pesos, adjusted for underreporting by ECLAC.
f For total country, 75th  percentile = 124,821 pesos, 90th percentile = 238,856 pesos.
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of medical attention was different for that given in other
ambulatory services. Almost 90% of emergency care
users with any type of Fonasa or Armed Forces coverage
used public (or Armed Forces) providers, and about
one-third of those with Isapre coverage also used public
providers.
The only area where Fonasa A members have better
access to care is in the proportion who report a well-
visit (“control preventivo”) in the period in question,
although the absolute level of such visits (25%) is low
for a population in this age group. The trend is the
opposite for women reporting having had a pap smear,
where the 80% figure for those with private insurance
is almost double the rate for those with Fonasa A.
Consultations with specialists are most commonly
reported among those with Fonasa D, private insurance,
and Armed Forces coverage, while they are least likely
among those with Fonasa A or private arrangements.
Within Fonasa, there is a steady increase, from those
with the lowest incomes (Fonasa A) to the highest
(Fonasa D), in most indicators of access to care.
Among those who visited a doctor on account of
an illness or accident, about 90% of those with Fonasa
A reported no out of pocket costs, in comparison with
about 5% of those with Armed Forces or private
insurance (table 2). Since Fonasa A and Fonasa B charge
no copayments for visits to public clinics, those
reporting that they had to pay were primarily those who
sought private care (7% of Fonasa A and 28% of Fonasa
B medical visits for illness/injury were to private
providers). When medicines were prescribed, two-thirds
of those with Fonasa A received the medication at no
TABLE 2
Chile: Indicators of health care access of persons aged 65
and over, according to insurance type, 1998a
(Percentages)
Entire Fonasa A Fonasa B Fonasa C Fonasa D Fonasa Armed Isapres Private
countryb (indigents) (exact plan Forces (private) arrange-
 not known)c ments
Illness/accident
in past 3 months 36.7 39.7 40.3 34.7 35.6 27.5 33 28.7 27
If so, received medical
attentiond 82.8 77.4 83.3 85.5 93 79.8 87.9 92.3 75.4
Satisfied with promptness
of medical attention 86.8 82.7 86.6 84.2 90.3 93.9 89.8 95.0 88.6
Ambulatory care
by private providerd 24.8 7.2 27.7 36.8 48.6 52.3 17.9 91.7 61.3
Emergency care
by public sector
providere 82.2 88.9 86.3 85.3 89.7 69.2 89.2 32.5 50.0
Had a well-visitd 21.4 25.3 25 19.1 15.2 19.7 17.9 13.1 9.4
Ever had a Pap
smear (women) 55.8 41.7 55.1 64.0 66.4 54.7 72.1 80.8 58.4
Had a specialist visitd 10.6 7.9 10.7 13.0 15.9 5.6 13.7 14.7 7.2
Had no out of pocket
expenses for illness
caref 58.4 89.5 65.9 39.1 25.6 34.8 5.5 6.1 15.6
Had no out of pocket
expenses for
prescriptionsf 40.8 67.7 42.4 21.2 18.3 41.5 7.6 4.3 10.4
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of research results.
a FONASA: National Health Fund. Isapres: Private health insurance companies. Armed Forces: Health system of the Chilean Armed Forces.
b Includes “other” and “don’t know” insurance types, which are not shown separately and constitute 1.3% of respondents.
c Corresponds to persons who are FONASA members but do not know at which level.
d During last three months.
e Includes National Health Service System (SNSS), Emergency Primary Attention Service (SAPU) and the Armed Forces system.
f In connection with ambulatory attention received.
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cost, compared to about 5% of those with private
insurance (Isapres) and 8% with military insurance
(table 2).
 While it might appear that income should have no
influence on access to health care by those with free
Fonasa A (indigent) coverage, there is nonetheless a
significant improvement in access figures for Fonasa
A beneficiaries with per capita household incomes
above the national median, compared to those below
it. For example, older persons in Fonasa A with per
capita household incomes above the median were more
likely than those below the median to obtain medical
care when sick (81.7% versus 75.9%, p<.05) and were
less likely to report delays when they sought medical
care (9.7% versus 20.0%, p=.000). As might be
expected, older persons with Isapre private insurance,
who face potentially high copayments, also exhibited
an income effect, even though they had notably higher
incomes than those in Fonasa A. Elderly persons in
Isapres with per capita household incomes in the top
10% nationally were more likely than other elderly
Isapre members (who were mostly in the eighth and
ninth income deciles) to obtain medical care when sick
(95.5% versus 85.5%, p<.05) and were less likely to
report delays in receiving medical care (2.1% versus
8.6%, p=.000). A similar income effect exists for older
persons with Armed Forces insurance. This variation
by income within each type of insurance suggests that
at least part of the access differences between insurance
types may be the result of the different income profiles
of each insurance type.
The differences between types of insurance in
table 3 are adjusted for some of the differences in
socioeconomic situation (SES) and show that plans
continue to display significant differences in the access
to care that they provide. The table shows that,
compared to older persons with Isapre (private) health
insurance, those with Armed Forces insurance have a
statistically similar likelihood of having been sick or
having had an accident in the past three months, while
those with Fonasa C or D have a 27% greater chance
(odds ratio (OR) = 1.27) of being ill, after SES
adjustment. Fonasa A and B both have similar odds,
with a 46% and 47% greater likelihood of reporting an
illness compared to those with Isapre insurance.
Although table 3 only presents odds ratios compared
to those with Isapres insurance, it also shows the
statistical comparisons between each type of insurance.
For example, those with Armed Forces insurance are
statistically similar (=) in their risk of illness to those
with Isapre and Fonasa C/D, but are less likely to report
an illness (<) than those in Fonasa A or B. When the
odds ratio is less than 1.0 it means that the group is less
likely to report the outcome in question. For example,
among those who reported an illness/accident in the
past three months, those with Fonasa A had 0.44 times
the odds (i.e., less than half the odds, or 56% less) of
reporting that they had sought medical care, compared
with those in Isapres. This is statistically less than
Fonasa B, Fonasa C/D, and the Isapres, but not less
than for members of the Armed Forces system.2
Similarly, those seeking care are least likely to report
that they obtained prompt medical attention if they are
in Fonasa A, with increasing promptness for Fonasa B,
and then for Fonasa C/D, the Armed Forces, and Isapres
together. When an additional variable was added for
using private versus public outpatient services (not
shown), the differences between insurance schemes as
regards prompt care attenuated to the point of not being
statistically significant, whereas the variable for private
health care arrangements was significant (OR=2.1,
p=.000). This suggests that the location where care was
received was more important than the type of insurance
covering that care.
After applying the statistical controls, those with
Armed Forces coverage have overall access indicators
that are closest to those with Isapres and Fonasa C/D,
while Fonasa A and B are often more similar to each
other than to Fonasa C/D and usually have the worst
access indicators. In this matrix, those with Fonasa C/
D are always different from Fonasa A, while the
wealthier Fonasa C/D members have indicators similar
to those of Isapre members in two areas (i.e., consulting
a doctor on account of illness/injury and consulting a
specialist for the same reason). While differences persist
in access to care between those with different types of
insurance even after applying controls for SES
differences, it is impossible to fully control for SES
because Fonasa A is, by definition, a social welfare
insurance that contains people who cannot afford any
other type of insurance.
While table 3 only presents the adjusted odds ratios
by insurance type, it is also useful for describing the
pattern of other significant independent variables, in
order to highlight factors other than type of medical
insurance which influence equity of health care access
2
 Fonasa A is different from Fonasa C/D but not the Armed Forces
primarily because the smaller sample size of those with Armed
Forces insurance requires larger differences to be statistically
significant.
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for older persons. In the logistic regressions underlying
the tables, older persons in rural areas were more likely
to report an illness but were less likely to report a
medical care visit when sick. Rural residents were also
less likely to report specialist visits or pap smears, but
more likely to report timely care, net of other variables.
Older women were more likely to report an illness and
were also more likely to report specialist and preventive
visits. The oldest of the elderly category were more
likely to report an illness than the younger elderly, and
they were also more likely to report prompt medical
attention and specialist visits, but less likely to have
ever had a pap smear (in the case of women). Elderly
people with any high school education were more likely
TABLE 3
Chile: Odds Ratios (OR) for access to health services through publicly
supported schemes,a compared to access by elderly persons with Isapre
health insurance, controlling for differences in gender, age, education, income,
and rural residence b
Fonasa A Fonasa B Fonasa C/D Armed Forces
(sample n=1 999)c (sample n=2 407) (sample n=630) (sample n=177)
Sickness/accident in past 3 months OR=1.46 OR=1.47 OR=1.27 OR=1.12
Statistical differences in above, across plans = Fonasa B = Fonasa A < Fonasa A < Fonasa A
> Fonasa C/D > Fonasa C/D < Fonasa B < Fonasa B
> FFAA > FFAA = FFAA = Fonasa C/D
> Isapres > Isapres > Isapres = Isapres
Among those who were sick and saw a medical provider 0.44 0.54 0.78 0.65
Statistical differences in above, across plans < Fonasa B > Fonasa A > Fonasa A = Fonasa A
< Fonasa C/D < Fonasa C/D > Fonasa B = Fonasa B
= FFAA = FFAA = FFAA = Fonasa C/D
< Isapres < Isapres = Isapres = Isapres
Persons who were sick, saw a doctor, and were satisfied
with the promptness of the medical attention 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.48
< Fonasa B > Fonasa A > Fonasa A > Fonasa A
< Fonasa C/D = Fonasa C/D = Fonasa C/D = Fonasa B
< FFAA = FFAA = FFAA = Fonasa C/D
< Isapres < Isapres < Isapres < Isapres
Persons who reported having visited a specialist 0.76 0.86 1.05 0.94
= Fonasa B = Fonasa A > Fonasa A = Fonasa A
< Fonasa C/D < Fonasa C/D > Fonasa B = Fonasa B
= FFAA = Fonasa B = FFAA = Fonasa C/D
< Isapres = Isapres = Isapres = Isapres
Persons who reported having undergone
a preventive care examination 1.72 1.7 1.24 1.23
= Fonasa B = Fonasa A < Fonasa A < Fonasa A
> Fonasa C/D > Fonasa C/D < Fonasa B < Fonasa B
> FFAA > FFAA = FFAA = FFAA
> Isapres > Isapres > Isapres = Isapres
Persons who had ever had a Pap smear (women) 0.3 0.41 0.5 0.72
< Fonasa B > Fonasa A > Fonasa A > Fonasa A
< Fonasa C/D = Fonasa C/D = Fonasa B > Fonasa B
< FFAA < FFAA < FFAA > Fonasa C/D
< Isapres < Isapres < Isapres < Isapres
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the research results.
a Fonasa: National Health Fund; Isapres: private health insurance companies; FFAA: health system of the Chilean Armed Forces. Fonasa
has four levels (A, B, C and D); persons who reported that they belonged to Fonasa but did not know at what level (n = 414) were assigned
to one of the levels using a hot deck imputation procedure.
b Logistic regression equation with Isapres as the reference group (n = 146), controlling for gender, age (65-69, 70-74, 75+), education
(0-8 vs. 9+ years), low income (<45,000 pesos/month per capita household income vs. higher incomes), and rural residence.
c The values of n are for those reporting an illness
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to seek medical care when sick, to see a specialist, or
to have had a pap smear (in the case of women), but
less likely to report preventive visits. Regardless of
V
Conclusions
insurance type, income is associated with greater
likelihood of seeing a specialist, or having had a pap
smear in the case of women.
Improving equity in health care has become an
important goal of the democratic Chilean State, as well
as of many other countries around the world. Such
equity involves an equitable distribution of the financing
of health services, the processes of care (including
access and quality), and the outcomes of care (WHO,
2000). Most of the public discussions on equity in the
Chilean health care arena have focused on the
differences between public and private health insurance.
This article shows that there is a wide variation of access
to care both between and within the different types of
health insurance for the group that has the highest need
for and use of medical care – the elderly. Because most
elderly have limited resources, they are particularly
vulnerable to inequities in medical services.
The cost of private health insurance for older
persons is beyond the means of all but the wealthiest,
because private health insurance premiums are risk
adjusted by age. The study shows that the 7% of
persons aged 65 and over with private health insurance
are wealthier, have more education, and are younger
than those with other types of insurance. Not
surprisingly, they are also less likely to report an
illness, and more likely to have better access to care
than other groups of persons over 65. Other studies
have noted that in the general population many of
those with private insurance make use of public
hospitals, so that the public sector ends up subsidizing
private insurance (Ministry of Planning and
Cooperation, 1999; Titelman, 1999) and improving
the level of access for the members of Isapres. The
present study shows that a similar pattern exists in the
case of emergency medical attention, where one-third
of the privately insured elderly who need emergency
care rely on public services. This suggests that older
persons with private insurance have access to both
public and private sector providers as needed. Even
within this high-income group, however, those with
the highest incomes (i.e., the top decile nationally)
had better access than other elderly persons with
private insurance (Isapres). This can be explained by
the frequently high copayments required by private
insurance schemes and the fact that, among private
providers, the most expensive hospitals and clinics may
provide the promptest and most specialized care.
The concentration of older persons in the public
system makes the situation as regards equity within that
system particularly important for that population group.
The main State-supported health insurance system,
Fonasa, has different types of insurance that are based
on different levels of premiums, which in turn are based
on earnings. This means that the four Fonasa groups
have different socioeconomic characteristics. The two
most common insurance types among the older
population are Fonasa A, which is for indigent persons,
and Fonasa B, which is for those with the lowest
pensions and income. Neither Fonasa A or B require
copayments in the public system, and their beneficiaries
report similar levels of illness/injury, use of medical
care when sick, specialist use, and preventive care use,
even after controlling for differences in age, gender,
rural residence, education, and low per capita household
income. In general, the members of Fonasa C and D
(combined for the multivariate analysis) are wealthier
than those of Fonasa A or B, but not as wealthy as those
with private insurance (Isapres). Even after controlling
for SES characteristics, Fonasa C/D beneficiaries have
better access than those of Fonasa A and B,
notwithstanding the copayments required. Delays in
obtaining an appointment, which have been a chronic
problem in the public sector for years, were experienced
most by Fonasa A, whereas Fonasa B, C and D (and
Armed Forces) registered better indicators in this
respect. The improved performance of Fonasa B versus
Fonasa A with regard to delays in appointments for
older persons may be due, in part, to the more frequent
use of private providers by Fonasa B members, despite
their low incomes. This use of private providers may
serve as a safety valve when the public system becomes
overcrowded. Other contributory factors behind the
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differences in access between Fonasa A and B could be
insufficient medical resources in the poorest
communities, where Fonasa A beneficiaries are most
likely to live, or administrative problems in those
communities that lead to delays in the provision of
health care.
After the financially privileged private insurance
sector, the Armed Forces plan (which has its own
medical care delivery system) appears to provide the
next best access overall for older persons, followed by
the Fonasa plans (B, C, and D) which give the option
of making use of private suppliers, and the situation of
elderly persons with higher incomes. The elderly
persons with the highest need and fewest resources are
found in Fonasa A, which exhibits the worst profile in
terms of access to care. In view of the fact that they are
not requires to make copayments in the public system,
however, their access problems would be much worse
if they had to use private health insurance. The poorest
elderly persons –those in Fonasa A– also apparently
face a number of barriers to obtaining needed medical
care that are not measured here. Among these non-
insurance related barriers are transportation costs to
clinics; organizational barriers such as the frequently
mentioned queues and waiting times at public clinics,
and/or the insufficient supply of medical resources in
the poorest communities (Wagstaff, 2001).3 Quality of
care problems may also discourage some persons from
seeking care. Public providers of medical care were
rated as “excellent” by 67% of respondents of all ages,
compared with 84% who gave private health care
providers that rating. It is important to distinguish
between the insurance provider and the medical care
provider, however, since the public sector Fonasa
insurance scheme was rated excellent by 72% of
respondents while the private sector Isapre insurance
system was given that rating by only 50% (El Mercurio,
2000). The public health care provision system is trying
to deal with some service problems, including the long
waiting lists and insufficient infrastructure (Gutiérrez,
2000), while the Isapre insurance system is trying to
improve its insurance image by adding coverage for
selected high-cost (“catastrophic”) illnesses whose cost
previously exceeded coverage limits by large amounts.
3
 For example, one government official reported that it was difficult
for older persons with pneumonia to obtain a public hospital bed
during the winter when total hospital demand was at a peak. After
a program was started that paid public hospitals extra for each
admission of older persons suffering from pneumonia, however,
there was a marked improvement in access.
The only area where low-income elderly persons
in Fonasa A and B have better outcomes than others is
in their access to preventive care: a service which is
covered by all insurance types but is free in public
clinics. The overall rates are low, however –13% for
those with private insurance and 25% for those with
Fonasa A– which suggests that most elderly persons
consider seeking medical care only for curative
purposes and not for prevention. The high reliance of
Fonasa A recipients on public clinics may result in their
being called more often for preventive visits when they
make use of the clinic on account of illness.
It is important to note that only a limited number
of indicators on access to care were available for this
analysis. Most of the indicators concern the receipt of
different types of medical services, and there were no
data that allowed for an adjustment to take account of
different levels of medical need. Since low-income
persons typically have higher medical needs than
wealthier persons, it is likely that adjustments for
medical need would increase the levels of inequalities
in service use. Identifying effective ways of reducing
these inequalities (by means other than income
redistribution) would require additional data about the
factors that influence the receipt of medical care,
including the relative availability of services, how easy
it is to reach and pay for those services, and how
different groups evaluate the quality and responsiveness
of their care.
Because of Chile’s favourable long-term
macroeconomic growth, it is often looked on as a model
for structural adjustment policies. However, the
legitimacy of democratic governments must be built
on social as well as economic results. In Chile, health
care has been an important sector for demonstrating
the government’s goal of growth with equity. The
present analysis focused on the population aged 65 and
over because these persons make most use of health
services and are thus most seriously affected by any
inequities in the medical care system. The cross-
sectional data used cannot show if the equity of access
to medical care for the elderly improved during the
1990s, but they do document inequities that still
remained in 1998, both between public and private
insurance, as well as within each type of insurance.
Much of the attention in discussions of health care
reform has been on the benefits and financing
mechanisms of public and private insurance. This study
shows that while equity in benefits and financing may
be a necessary component of overall health system
equity, it is not in itself sufficient, since access varies
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within the different types of insurance. This is
particularly significant in the case of the older
population, since a quarter of these persons are in
Fonasa A, which exhibits the lowest levels of access of
all insurance types.
In the current public health care system, those with
moderate financial resources are allowed to pay extra to
access the private health system, regardless of whether
or not they have private insurance. But private health
service providers are located primarily in higher income
areas, meaning that low income elderly persons would
have little access to this resource even if it were available
and free to all with public insurance. Thus, the most
effective and feasible way to improve access to medical
care for older persons (an element of equity at the process
level) would be to continue to improve the operations of
public sector providers. This may involve increasing the
payments made by Isapres to public providers when
Isapre members make use of public emergency medical
services and public hospitals, or increasing the allocation
of public funds. It will also mean continuing to improve
the organization and administration of public sector
medical services (Sojo, 1999). It is critical that equity of
access for the elderly is considered, along with equity of
financing, when policies are debated concerning health
care reform in Chile, as well as in any other country that
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